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The Mortality Effects of Changing Public Funding for Home Health Care: an Empirical 
Analysis of Medicare Home Health Care in the United States 
 
                                                              C. Orsini1 
                                                                     
                                                                  Abstract 
In light of population aging, it is important to understand whether limiting public in-kind 
transfers to the elderly affects elderly mortality. I focus on home health care²a popular in-kind 
transfer²and I exploit variation in the Medicare home health care reimbursement that arose in 
1997 in the US to study whether cuts to government coverage of home health care affected 
elderly mortality. Under the identifying assumptions of the DID model, I find that the cuts 
affected total mortality for some men but not women, suggesting that changes in home health 
care can affect elderly mortality and differences in mortality between men and women. For men 
aged between 65 and 74, the Interim Payment System was associated with an increase in 
mortality equal to 0.6 percent, an effect in absolute value comparable to the mortality response 
to a one percentage point change in unemployment rates and within the range of other estimates 
of the impact of health insurance on elderly mortality.  
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1. Introduction 
Population ageing around the world is placing increasing pressure on government 
budgets (Pilichowski, Arnould, and Turkisch, 2007), so it is becoming increasingly important to 
determine whether limiting public transfers to the elderly may affect their wellbeing. Given that 
health care represents a growing share of government spending around the world and that the 
elderly are primary recipients of health care, it is of particular interest to understand the impact 
of limiting health care services to the elderly. 2   
 In this paper I study whether public cuts in home health care affect elderly mortality. 
Home health care is an in-kind transfer popular in many countries consisting of health care 
services provided in the SDWLHQW¶VKRPH. 3 Cuts in home health care can in principle impact 
mortality because home health care services tend to include skilled nursing services provided to 
patients with serious conditions who may not receive the essential care they need should the 
service be cut. For example, for the United States in 1996, the year before the policy change 
studied here, 41 percent of home health care visits provided through the Medicare program were 
visits provided by skilled nurses, and patients admitted to home health care included those with 
serious conditions such as heart disease, cancer, cerebrovascular disease, diabetes, and chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease.  
                                                          
2
 For example, public health expenditures as a percentage of the GDP for year 2014 (and for 2007 in parentheses) 
were 8.6 (7.8) for France, 9.2 (7.6) for Germany, 5.7 (6.5) for Spain, 6.9 (6.2) for the UK, and 7.9 (6.9) for the US. 
Data are from the OECD (accessed in January 2017): http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/health-data.htm. 
Additionally, for the US, expenditures by the Medicare program (as a percentage of the GDP) were 2.9 in 2007 and 
3.3 in 2012, the latest year for which data are available from the Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement 
(data accessed in January 2017): https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-
and-Reports/MedicareMedicaidStatSupp/2013.html.  
3
 For instance, in 2014 expenditures on home health care as a percentage of public health expenditure were 2.1 in 
Germany, 3.7 in France, 0.8 in Spain, and 3 in the UK. For the US, expenditures on Medicare home health care as a 
percent of expenditure on the Medicare program were equal to 3.3 percent in 2012 (the most recent year for which 
data are available from the Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement) and equal to 11.3 percent in 1996, the 
year before the policy change studied here (data for total expenditure on Medicare for 1996 are from the United 
States Government Printing Office, accessed in January 2017 https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-
106WPRT56395/html/CPRT-106WPRT56395.htm. Data for expenditures on Medicare home health care in 1996 
are from the Medicaid and Medicare Statistical Supplement for year 1996). 
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 To study whether cuts in the provision of home health care can affect elderly mortality, I 
take advantage of a unique legislative change in the United States that modified government 
financing for Medicare home health care in the 1990s.4 The policy change created the Interim 
Payment System (IPS), which de facto generated time and state variation in cuts in government 
financing for Medicare home health care. Specifically, the IPS imposed a cap on the average 
reimbursement per patient that home health agencies (i.e. home health care providers) were 
entitled to receive when treating elderly Medicare patients. The cap was a blend of each home 
KHDOWKDJHQF\¶VDYHUDJHSHUSDWLHQWFRVWLQDQGWKHDYHUDJHSHUSDWLHQWFRVWRIKRPHKHDOWK
DJHQFLHVLQWKHDJHQF\¶VFHQVXVGLYLVLRQ5 Because the cap had a regional component, even states 
with similar pre-policy utilization potentially faced different restrictive reimbursement limits 
relative to the average utilization in their census division.  For instance, home health agencies in 
Georgia and Oklahoma provided similar average amounts of care to their users before 1997, but 
the agencies in Georgia faced a more restrictive cap as a result of the 1997 change than did the 
agencies in Oklahoma because the regional average per patient cost in the South Atlantic census 
division prior to the law change was lower than the regional average in the West South Central 
census division.6 The imposition of an average per patient cap created the incentive for agencies 
not to treat patients with long-term care needs (McKnight 2004), and, in fact, McKnight (2006) 
finds that the decline in home health care visits was especially pronounced for those identified as 
the sickest Medicare beneficiaries. The reimbursement mechanism introduced by the policy 
change allows me to exploit variation across time and across states to estimate a reduced-form 
equation to study whether the cap affected elderly mortality.7 I conduct the analysis by gender 
and age as well as by gender and age group for five of the most important causes of death for the 
                                                          
4
 See Section 2 on Medicare home health care. 
5
 A census division is a cluster of states. See https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-
data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf. 
6
 This example is taken from McKnight (2004, 2006). 
7
 This strategy was proposed by McKnight when studying the impact of the cuts on home health care service 
provision (2004, 2006). 
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elderly: diseases of the heart, malignant neoplasm, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and 
allied conditions, cerebrovascular disease, and diabetes mellitus. I group the remaining causes of 
death into a residual category.  
  This paper is the first to study whether the imposition of limits on public reimbursement 
to home health care affected total elderly mortality using administrative microdata on the universe 
of deaths for the elderly of a country. I am also the first researcher to study whether the IPS 
affected elderly mortality by looking at subgroups defined by age, gender, and cause of death. 
 Specifically, this paper furthers previous literature that focused on other aspects of the IPS 
for home health care but whose main focus was not whether the IPS affected mortality. For 
instance, work by McKnight (2006, 2004) uses survey data from the Medicare Current 
Beneficiary Survey to look at the impact of the IPS on home health care utilization and out of 
pocket expenditures for home health, as well as the impact of the IPS on Body Mass Index, 
difficulty with stooping or kneeling, lifting 10 pounds, and walking 2-3 blocks. McKnight (2006) 
shows that the IPS did not significantly affect the health measures listed above, and in a footnote 
writes that mortality was not significantly affected by the IPS, although results are not reported.  
A possible explanation IRU0F.QLJKW¶VILQGLQJVRQPRUWDOLW\LVWKHVPDOOVDPSOHVL]HRIWKH
survey used. Here I further the analysis of whether the IPS affected mortality because I use 
administrative data on the universe of death for the elderly, overcoming the possible small sample 
size issues encountered in using survey data. I also conduct the analysis by gender, age bands and 
by cause of death, which has not been done before. 
 Previous research that has tangentially looked at the impact of the IPS on mortality also 
includes the paper by Huckfeldt et al. (2015), who study a subgroup of Medicare patients, namely 
those discharged from hospital for stroke, hip fracture, or lower extremity joint replacement, and 
therefore confine their analysis to those patients. Huckfeldt et al. (2015) focus mainly on the 
impact of Medicare home health care payment reforms on home health payments, costs, and 
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admissions. Additionally, Huckfeldt et al. (2015) find that the IPS did not affect total mortality for 
their sample of patients.
8
 My focus differs from that of Huckfeldt et al. (2015) because I am 
interested in understanding whether the IPS affected total elderly mortality. I do so because the 
patients studied in Huckfeldt et al. (2015) are not all patients eligible to receive home health care. 
In fact, for example, for year 2000 (Department of Health and Human Services, 2001) data show 
that 48 percent of Medicare home health users had no previous hospitalizations, meaning that the 
IPS could have in principle affected mortality for a large group of people not considered in the 
sample Huckfeldt et al. (2015) focus on.
9
 Because the IPS caused a cream skimming of 
beneficiaries receiving Medicare home health care that altered the participation margin in 
Medicare home health care, it is not possible to look at the impact of the IPS on mortality 
conditional on receiving any home health care (as noted also by McKnight 2006 when looking at 
other outcomes). Here the data allow me to focus on whether the IPS affected mortality of elderly 
individuals who are at least 65 years of age. Under the identifying assumptions of my 
identification strategy, I find that the IPS was associated with an increase equal to 0.6 in the 
overall mortality rate for men aged between 65 and 74. The magnitude of this effect is comparable 
in absolute value to mortality responses to a one percentage point change in the unemployment 
rates found in published work (Ruhm, 2000 and McInerney and Mellor, 2012 when looking at the 
same period studied in Ruhm, 2000) and within the range of estimates of the impact of insurance 
on mortality (see Section 4.1). In contrast, the IPS did not affect total mortality for older men, 
perhaps because older men tend to be more fragile, and the results here suggest there are 
decreasing marginal returns in terms of preventing mortality with home health care for patients 
                                                          
8
 Huckfeldt et al. (2015), exclusively focusing on Medicare patients discharged from hospital for stroke, hip 
fracture, or lower extremity joint replacement, study the impact of Medicare payment reform on home health 
payments, costs and admissions looking at the Perspective Payment System (the system implemented after the IPS) 
and the IPS. Here I, as other research (McKnight, 2006) has done, focus on the IPS because only the IPS (and not 
the PPS) generated geographic and time series variation in the intensity of treatment (treatment being the 
imposition of limits in reimbursement).  
9
 Additionally, other papers have used the identification strategy first proposed by McKnight: Engelhardt and 
Greenhalgh-Stanley (2010), Golberstein et al. (2009), and Orsini (2010). 
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who are particularly frail. I also find that the IPS did not affect total mortality for women. It is 
well known that men and women have different mortality (Sickles and Taubman, 1997), and the 
reasons behind such differences as well as the reasons behind changes in such differences over 
time are not clear. My findings contribute to filling a gap in our understanding of the causes of 
changes in differences in mortality by gender: cuts in the provision of public home health care are 
possible triggers of changes in differences in mortality by gender, at least when considering the 
time frame of about three years, as I consider here due to the time period for which the IPS was in 
place. 
2. Medicare Home Health Care and the IPS 
2.1 Medicare Home Health Care 
 Medicare was enacted by Congress in the United States in 1965 to meet the health 
insurance needs of the elderly and the disabled. During the time period considered in this paper, 
Medicare consisted of three parts: hospital insurance, known as Part A, a supplementary medical 
insurance, known as part B, and a third part, known as Part C, WKDW H[SDQGHG EHQHILFLDULHV¶
options for participating in private-sector health care plans. Medicare Part A is provided 
automatically and free of charge to people 65 or older that are eligible to receive Social Security 
or Railroad Retirement Benefits. Until 1997, Medicare Part A covered inpatient hospital care, 
short-term skilled nursing facilities services, hospice care, and home health care. Since 1997, 
Medicare Part A has covered all home health care visits for individuals not enrolled in Part A. For 
individuals enrolled in Medicare Part B, Medicare part A covers the first 100 home health care 
visits that follow an inpatient stay, and Part B covers visits in excess to the limit imposed after the 
inpatient stay and visits that are needed without a previous inpatient stay. Medicare home care 
covers six health care services: skilled nursing, physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech 
therapy, medical social work, and home health aide. Services provided by skilled nurses have the 
potential to save lives given that a large fraction of home health care patients suffer from 
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potentially lethal conditions such as, but not limited to, heart disease and cancer, and services 
performed by nurses at home may be crucial to save some patients¶ lives. Examples of skilled care 
include wound care for pressure sores or a surgical wound, intravenous or nutrition therapy, 
injections, monitoring serious illness and unstable health status, teaching about prescription drugs, 
monitoring medication adherence, and administering medications.10 Home health nurses not only 
provide direct care and teach the patient and his/her caregivers about care for the patient, but they 
also manage, observe, and evaluate the care needs of the patient.  
 Potentially, even visits by home health aides could save lives. This is because the law in 
place in the period under study requires that home health aides undergo training aimed at 
recognizing emergencies and knowledge of emergency procedures, meaning that if a home health 
aide is visiting and an emergency arises, he/she has some training to respond to it.11  
 In order to be eligible to receive Medicare home health care, Medicare beneficiaries need 
WR EH ³KRPH-ERXQG´ DQG LQ QHHG RI ³LQWHUPLWWHQW´ DQG ³SDUW-WLPH´ FDUH 6XFK FDUe can be 
substantial. In fact, Medicare defines part-WLPHRU³LQWHUPLWWHQW´FDUHas the care needed or given 
on fewer than 7 days each week or less than 8 hours each day with some exceptions in special 
circumstances. Additionally, Medicare does not cover home health aide services unless patients 
                                                          
10
 See: https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/home-health-care/home-health-care-what-is-it-what-to-
expect.html and Department of Health and Human Services (2010), Montauk, 1998 and the Medicare Benefit 
Policy Manual - Home Health Services. For examples of services performed by skilled nurses, see 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/bp102c07.pdf. For instance, there 
is a need for skilled nursing in those cases where there is a reasonable potential for change in a patient's condition 
because there was a reasonable potential for a complication or an acute episode. For example, consider the case of a 
patient with congestive heart failure who requires observation by skilled nursing personnel for signs of adverse 
effects resulting from newly prescribed medication, or cases in which a patient needs administration of medications 
that the patient herself, because of age and condition, would not be able to administer. Also, there are cases in 
which the administration of medications always requires skilled nursing, such as intravenous treatments. 
11
 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 42, Chapter IV, Subchapter G, Part 484, Subpart A, Section 484.36. 
Additionally, the law states that the aide training program must address each of the following subject areas: 
communications skills, observation, reporting and documentation of patient status and the care or service furnished, 
reading and recording temperature, pulse, and respiration, basic infection control procedures, basic elements of 
body functioning and changes in body function that must be reported to an aide's supervisor, maintenance of a 
clean, safe, and healthy environment, recognizing emergencies and knowledge of emergency procedures, the 
physical, emotional, and developmental needs of and ways to work with the populations served by the home health 
agency, including the need for respect for the patient, his or her privacy and his or her property, appropriate and 
safe techniques in personal hygiene and grooming, safe transfer techniques and ambulation, normal range of 
motion and positioning, adequate nutrition and fluid intake, any other task that the home health agency may choose 
to have the home health aide perform. 
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are also getting skilled care such as nursing care or physical therapy, occupational therapy, or 
speech-language pathology services from the home health agency. Table 1 shows that patients do 
receive a substantial amount of skilled care, which dropped considerably as a consequence of the 
IPS.12 
  
2.2 The IPS 
  The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 changed reimbursement for Medicare home 
health care. The change introduced by the law involved two steps. First, from 1997 to 2000, an 
Interim Payment System (IPS) was established that put a cap on how much each home care 
agency would be reimbursed per patient per year (agencies were reimbursed on a cost basis before 
the IPS)7KHFDSKDGWZRSDUWVSHUFHQWRIWKHYDOXHZDVEDVHGRQHDFKDJHQF\¶VDYHUDJH
per patient cost and 25 percent was based on the DYHUDJHSHUSDWLHQWFRVWRIWKHDJHQF\¶VFHQVXV
division (a cluster of neighbouring states). For newer agencies the cap was set equal to the 
national median per-patient cost. The second step started in October 2000, when the IPS was 
changed to the Prospective Payment System (PPS). As the rules of the PPS did not vary by state, 
they generated time series variation but did not generate state variation as did the IPS. Therefore, 
as previous research has done for other outcomes (for example, See McKnight, 2006), I 
concentrate here on studying the impact of the IPS on mortality. 
 The cap introduced by the IPS implied that even states with similar pre-policy utilization 
potentially faced different reimbursement limits depending on their utilization relative to the 
average utilization in their census division.   
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Data are from the Health Care Financing Administration (1998 and 2001). 
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3. Data, Causes of Death, and Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Sample and Data  
To construct mortality rates, I use population estimates (denominator) produced by 
The Survey of Epidemiology and End Results (SEER), data used in other recent papers studying 
mortality,13 and micro-level data on the universe of deaths from the Multiple Causes of Death 
files (for the numerator) from year 1993 until year 2000, totalling 13,804,156 deaths for 
individuals aged 65 or more. The data contain the International Classification of Disease (ICD) 
codes to identify specific causes of death (see Appendix 1 and the section 3.2 for more 
details).14 
Because the IPS caused a cream skimming of beneficiaries receiving Medicare Home 
health care that altered the participation margin in Medicare home health care, it is not possible 
to look at the impact of the IPS on mortality conditional on receiving any home health care. 
Here the data allow me to focus on the impact of the IPS on the mortality of elderly individuals 
who are at least 65 years of age, a group for whom Medicare eligibility either directly or 
through the spouse is nearly universal (for example, 96.44 percent of elderly aged 65 or more 
are covered by Medicare, according to data from the Current Population Survey for year 
1996).15 
I conduct the analysis on elderly mortality by gender because it is well known that the 
most evident difference in health by gender is the differential mortality of men and women.16 
Additionally, I provide estimates by age groups: I consider the elderly aged between 65 and 74, 
                                                          
13
 Coile et al., 2014; Stevens et al., 2015; McInerney and Mellor, 2012. 
14
 Multiple Causes of Death data files provided by the CDC are commonly used to study mortality. See, for 
example, studies by Snyder and Evans (2006), Buckles et al. (2016), Evans and Moore (2011), and Evans and 
Moore (2012). 
15
 The paper by Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) is another study that looks at the impact of the introduction of 
Medicare on elderly mortality. 
16
 Brown, 2002; Case and Paxsons, 2005; Nathaanson, 1984; Zopf, 1992; Sickles and Taubman, 1997. 
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those aged between 75 and 84, and those aged 85 or older.17 Finally, I provide estimates by age 
and gender on several causes of death. I am not able to provide estimates on mortality by 
poverty level. Previous research (McKnight, 2004, 2006) has shown that the drop in home 
health care utilization as a consequence of the IPS was especially severe among patients with 
income below the poverty line. However, neither SEER data nor administrative microdata with 
death records have information on income (SEER provides data by age groups, gender, 
geographic area, and race), so I cannot provide estimates by socioeconomic status. 
 
3.2 Selected Causes of Death 
In principle, the decline in Medicare home health care could affect deaths due to many 
conditions because, to be eligible for Medicare home health care, a patient needs to be 
homebound and there are many health conditions that could make a patient homebound.  
However, some causes of death are of special interest because they represent top causes 
of death for people aged 65 or older, so, given that many people die from those causes, it is 
especially important to understand whether imposing limits on reimbursement of home health 
care impacts deaths from those causes. I focus on the five top causes of deaths for individuals 
aged 65 or more: diseases of the heart, malignant neoplasm, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease and allied conditions, cerebrovascular disease, and diabetes mellitus. I group the 
remaining deaths into a residual category. Table 2 shows the causes of death selected here as a 
fraction of total deaths for men and women aged 65 or older. 
Also, the selected causes of death are important to look at because data on the use of 
Medicare home health care (Health Care Financing Administration, various years) show that 
patients admitted to Medicare home health care are in large part admitted due to conditions that 
                                                          
17
 The subdivision is in line with the epidemiology of ageing that tends to divide the elderly into three categories: 
³\RXQJROG´³ROG´DQG³ROGROG´²those elderly whose age is, respectively, between 65 and 74, 75 and 84, and 85 
or more (see, for instance, Zizza et al., 2009). 
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either (1) are the causes of death18  I focus on here or  (2) are conditions that are risk factors for 
those causes of death.  Table 3 also shows that there was a large decline in the number of people 
receiving visits for every condition listed there. The number of visits per person for each 
condition also dramatically decreased after the IPS was implemented, making it possible that 
the IPS caused an increase in deaths for at least some of those conditions for some groups.    
However, it is difficult to predict accurately which cause of death a person will die from, 
because at any given point in time people are exposed to risks of death from various causes.   
For instance, Chiang (1991) writes that it is possible that in a study of cancer as a risk of death, 
some persons may die from other causes during the study period. Due to competing risks of 
death, it is possible, for instance, to observe an increase in mortality for some cause of death and 
a decrease in others, even when total mortality for a given group increases. Also, due to 
different stages of ageing and differences in mortality by gender, it is possible for the impact of 
the IPS on mortality and mortality by cause of death to be heterogeneous across age 
groups/gender/cause of death. 
 
 
                                                          
18
 For more information, please see Online Appendix 2. When presenting statistics or studying mortality by causes 
of death, it is common to group specific International Classification of Diseases (ICD) codes according to the 
World Health Organization (WHO) regulations. For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) commonly uses such groupings in presenting statistics on mortality (see, for example, the technical notes in 
the documents that accompany the mortality data provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), so I 
follow the literature here in grouping ICD codes for deaths according to the WHO convention. For instance, Table 
3 shows aggregated data on conditions of admission to Medicare home health care for year 1996 (Health Care 
Financing Administration, 1998). Referring to Table 3, let us consider people admitted to home health care for 
³'LVHDVHVRIWKH&LUFXODWRU\6\VWHP´7KHGLDJQRVLV,&'FRGHVZLWKLQWKHFDWHJRU\³'LVHDVHVRIWKH&LUFXODWRU\
6\VWHP´LQFOXGHDOOGLDJQRVHV,&'FRGHVWKDWDUHDOVRZLWKLQWKHFDWHJRU\RIGHDWKVIRU³'LVHDVHVRIWKH+HDUW´
DQG³&HUHEURYDVFXODU'LVHDVHV´SOXVWKHGLDJQRVLV,&'FRGHVRI³(VVHQWLDO+\SHUWHQVLRQ´ZKLFKLVDPDMRUULVN
IDFWRUIRUGHDWKVGXHWR³'LVHDVHVRIWKH+HDUW´DQGGHDWKVGXHWR³&HUHEURYDVFXODU'LVHDVHV´0HLVVQHU 
Also, patients admiWWHGWRKRPHKHDOWKFDUHIRU³QHRSODVPV´LQFOXGHWKRVHSHRSOHIRUZKRPWKHQHRSODVPPD\
GHJHQHUDWHLQWR³PDOLJQDQWQHRSODVPV´WRWKHSRLQWRIFDXVLQJWKHSHUVRQ¶VGHDWKDQGPDOLJQDQWQHRSODVPLVRQH
of the causes of death I focus on here. Finally, people admitted to home health care with the admission diagnosis 
³'LVHDVHVRIWKHUHVSLUDWRU\V\VWHP´DUHSHRSOHWKDWHLWKHUDOUHDG\KDYH³&KURQLF2EVWUXFWLYH3XOPRQDU\'LVHDVHV
DQG$OOLHG&RQGLWLRQV´LHWKH,&'FRGHVIRUSHRSOHZLWK'LVHDVHVRIWKH5HVSLUDWRUy system include the codes 
³&KURQLF2EVWUXFWLYH3XOPRQDU\'LVHDVHVDQG$OOLHG&RQGLWLRQV´ZKLFKFDQEHIDWDODQGZKLFKLVRQHRIWKH
causes of death I focus on here, or people with diagnoses recorded in the ICD codes that can potentially lead to 
death for Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Diseases and Allied Conditions. 
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3.3 Empirical Strategy 
3.3.1 Cross State Variation in the Policy Change 
The IPS imposed a cap based on a blend of each home health agency cost in 1994 and 
the cost in the census division. Therefore, two agencies with the same cost in 1994 but in states 
within different census divisions with different utilization may have faced very different caps 
after the IPS. The reasoning applied to an agency in a state can be applied to the average of 
agencies in that state, which allows me (following McKnight, 2004, 2006) to construct a 
measure of restriction in reimbursement of Medicare home health care at the state level. 
Therefore, with similar increasing trends between 1994 and 1997, states where aggregate home 
health agencies have average per patient costs below the census division in 1994 face a 
reimbursement limit that is less restrictive than the limit faced by states where, on average, the 
average per patient cost in 1994 is above the average per patient cost in their census division. 
McKnight (2004, 2006) constructs a measure that captures a cross-state component of 
the variation implied by the IPS with the main focus of identifying the impact of the IPS 
introduced in 1997 by the BBA on the number of Medicare home care visits received by 
Medicare beneficiaries. Here I use the same measure to study whether the IPS affected elderly 
mortality. 
To create the variable used by McKnight (2004, 2006) to capture the cross-state 
variation in reimbursement, I need to use a measure of cost. Here I follow McKnight (2006) and 
identify the average number of visits per user as the most appropriate measure of cost to use. 
More formally, McKnight (2004, 2006) defines the following measure of restriction in 
reimbursement generosity: 
 Restrictivenesssc ƖS- ƖC                                                                                                                           (1) 
ZKHUHƖS is the average number of Medicare home care visits per user in 1994 in state s, DQGƖC  
is the average number of MedicarHKRPHFDUHYLVLWVSHUXVHULQLQVWDWHV¶VFHQVXVGLYLVLRQ
13 
 
The restrictiveness measure is between -40.9 (Kentucky) and 34.7 (Utah). In Figure 1 I plot 
yearly mortality rates for men and women of various ages for states in the top 25th percentile of 
WKH5HVWULFWLYHQHVV0HDVXUH³+LJKO\5HVWULFWHG6WDWHV´DQGIRUVWDWHVLQWKHERWWRPth 
SHUFHQWLOHRIWKH5HVWULFWLYHQHVV0HDVXUH³2WKHU6WDWHV´)LJXUHVKRZVWKDWwhile mortality 
trends were similar in the two different groups of states before the policy change, mortality rates 
diverged beginning around 1998, especially for men. 
 
3.3.2 Difference-in-Differences Specification 
 Equation 2 presents the difference-in-differences strategy that compares changes in 
mortality rates in states that were more restricted by the IPS with changes in mortality rates in 
states that were less restricted by the IPS: 
 ܪ௜௝௧ ൌ ߙ௧ ൅ ௝ܵ ൅ ௝ܵݐ ൅ ܲ݋ݏݐ௧ߚ ൅ ܲ݋ݏݐ௧ כ ܴ݁ݏݐݎ݅ܿݐ݅ݒ݁݊݁ݏݏ௦௧ߛ ൅ ݑ௝௧ ൅ ݁௜௝௧ (2) 
 
 ܪ௜௝௧ is the natural logarithm of the mortality rate for the group in cell i defined by age and 
gender (age 65-74, age 75-84, age 85 or more; male, female) in state j in year t ; ߙ௧  and  ௝ܵ  are 
year and state fixed effects, and ௝ܵݐ are state trends.19 ܲ݋ݏݐ௧  is a dummy equal to 1 for years 
1998-2000 in which the IPS was in place (McKnight, 2006). ܴ݁ݏݐݎ݅ܿݐ݅ݒ݁݊݁ݏݏ௦௧captures state 
variation in the policy change; ݑ௝௧ are state unemployment rates, which, starting with Ruhm 
(2000), have been shown to be important determinants of mortality;  ݁௜௝௧ is the error term. I 
                                                          
19
 I also have estimated models without state trends, and the point estimates of the variable Post*Restrictiveness 
ZLWKRUZLWKRXWVWDWHWUHQGVDUHZLWKLQHDFKRWKHU¶VFRQILGHQFHLQWHUYDOV)RULQVWDQFHIRUSUHFLVHHVWLPDWHVIRUPHQ
65 or more, the point estimates and standard errors with state trends are 0.02432 and 0.01153, and those without 
state trends are 0.02434 and 0.01255. For the group of women aged 65 or more, estimates are in both cases (with 
and without state trends) very imprecise and an order of magnitude lower than those for men. Estimate*100 of the 
variable Post*Restrictiveness in the specification without state trends on the sample of women aged 65 or more is -
0.00386, which is within the 95% confidence interval of the estimates with state trends, which is -0.03941, 
0.04174. The estimate*100 of the variable Post*Restrictiveness with state trends is 0.0016, which is within the 
95% confidence interval of the estimate without state trends, which is [-0.03651, 0.02879]. 
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cluster the standard errors at the state level (Bertrand, Duflo, Mullainathan, 2004). To test the 
plausibility of the identification strategy²requiring that, absent the IPS, trends in mortality 
rates would have been the same in more intensively treated states compared to less intensively 
treated states²I restrict my sample to years 1993-1997 and interact year effects with the 
Restrictiveness measure, conditioning on state and year fixed effects as well as state 
unemployment rates. I test the null hypothesis that the interactions of year dummies with the 
Restrictiveness measure are jointly 0. From this exercise I cannot reject that trends in mortality 
were the same for more and less restricted states in the pre-policy period (Online Appendix 1 
section A.1.2 for more details).20 
 
3.3.3 Back of the Envelope Calculations 
We are interested in the number of deaths related to the IPS, also by cause(s) of death 
and age and gender groups. In this section I illustrate how I use estimates fromߛ  in Equation 2 
to calculate how many deaths were related to the IPS for different demographic groups.  
First, under the identifying assumptions of the DID model presented in the previous 
subsection, the estimate of  ߛ *100 gives the percent impact on mortality of living²during the 
post policy period²in a state that provided an additional one visit per user above the regional 
(census division) during the pre-policy period. Given that the census division portion of the IPS 
payment limit was 25%,  ߛ כ  ? ? ? can be interpreted as the percent impact on the mortality rate 
of cutting reimbursements by 0.25 visits per Medicare beneficiary in the post policy period, so 
to recover the impact of cutting reimbursement of one visit, ߛ כ  ? ? ? needs to be multiplied by 4. 
Second, to determine the impact of the IPS on mortality, we need an estimate of the impact of 
the IPS on the number of home health care visits. One estimate by McKnight (2006) shows that 
the IPS was associated with a decline equal to 3.4 visits per Medicare beneficiary, so to 
                                                          
20
 Online Appendix 3 also carries out an analysis that divides states into different groups based on the value of the 
Restrictiveness measure. Also, I added graphs illustrating trends in mortality rates in Online Appendix 3. 
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determine the impact on the elderly mortality rate of a decline in reimbursement of 3.4 visits per 
Medicare beneficiary,  ߛ כ  ? ? ?  needs to be multiplied by 13.6  
( i.e. 3.4*4= 13.6).21 
 Next, I focus on the post policy period and, keeping population estimates from SEER 
for years 1998-2000 constant, I use death records for years 1998-2000 to calculate the actual 
deaths for years 1998-2000 for each group and cause of death. I call this number ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௔௖௧௨௔௟. 
Also, I use the estimates from Equation 2 to conduct a counterfactual calculation of the number 
of deaths there would have been absent the policy change, and I call this number to be 
determinedܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ . Putting the steps together, I can calculate   ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌas 
follows (Online Appendix 1, section A1.3): 
 ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌሺ ? ൅ ? ?Ǥ ? כ ߛሻ ൌ ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௔௖௧௨௔௟                                 (3) 
 
Finally, with the estimate of  ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ I can calculate the estimate of the number of deaths 
for a specific group and cause of death as the difference between ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௔௖௧௨௔௟ and ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ . I report these estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Tables 4-7.22 
 
4. Results 
     4.1 Results on Total Mortality By Age and Gender 
 Under the identifying assumptions of the DID, results in the first row of Table 4 
(columns 1 and 2, in curly brackets) show that the IPS was associated with an increase equal to 
0.33 percent in the mortality rate for males at least 65 years of age. There is no significant effect 
                                                          
21
 The number 3.4 crucially relies on calculations made by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) in 
1999 on how many agencies were constrained by the policy and by how much these agencies were constrained 
(pages 305-306 and note 16), Health Care Financing Administration, 1999. 
22
 Please see Online Appendix IRUDFDOFXODWLRQRIWKHQXPEHURIGHDWKV³SHUUHGXFHGKRPHKHDOWKYLVLW´ 
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of the IPS on total mortality rates for women of any group. Table 4 shows a precise estimate of 
the impact of the IPS on mortality rates for men aged between 65 and 74. For this group the IPS 
was associated with an increase in mortality equal to 0.618 percent. The size of the effect is in 
absolute value comparable to the mortality response to a one percentage point change in state 
unemployment rates as provided by Ruhm, 2000, and as validated for the same period by 
McInerney and Mellor, 2012. Given that the mechanism behind the relationship between 
unemployment rates and mortality is not clear, it is also relevant to compare my estimates to the 
range of estimates of the effect of the HOGHUO\¶VKHDOWKLQVXUDQce on mortality. Such estimates 
vary: in some studies, the estimates are null or very small (Finkelstein and McKnight, 2008; 
Kaestner et al., 2014), recent estimates of the impact of Medicare Part D on elderly mortality are 
around 2.2 percent  (Huh and Reif, 2017), and other estimates are larger (Card et al., 2009; 
Sommers et al., 2014). 
Table 4 also shows that the total mortality rate for elderly aged 75 or more was not significantly 
affected and there was never a significant effect on total mortality rates for women. I report 
below the results of my estimates by selected causes of death and elaborate on possible 
explanations for my findings in section 5.23 
4.2 Results on Mortality from Specific Causes By Age and Gender 
 When conducting an analysis of multiple outcomes, there is need to correct for multiple 
comparisons, to correct for the possibility that some precise results may simply be due to 
                                                          
23
 I also estimated Equation 2 on the group of people aged 25-34, a group which, when considered in its entirety, is 
unlikely to be much affected by the IPS due to the small fraction of people in that group enrolled in Medicare. 
Indeed, from my tabulations from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System in 1997, only 2.2 percent of 
people aged 25-34 are enrolled in Medicare (people younger than 65 can be enrolled in Medicare if they are 
disabled or have End of Stage Renal Disease). Although it is entirely possible that the IPS affected the mortality of 
the 2.2 percent of Medicare enrolees aged 25-34, due to the small fraction of people aged 25-34 with Medicare in 
the group of people aged between 25 and 34, I expect that my estimates of the effect of the IPS on mortality rates 
for the group of people between 25 and 34 years of age are very imprecise, which I find. In fact, the point estimates 
and standard errors multiplied by 100 of the variable Post*Restrictiveness from the model in Equation 2 estimated 
on the group of people aged between 25 and 34 are, respectively, 0.04906 and 0.06485 (with a P-value of 0.453) 
for men, and -0.01819 and 0.10175 (with a P-value of 0.853) for women. 
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chance. A first method for doing so consists in the aggregation of outcomes in one or more 
groups. When using this approach, and when outcomes are different from each other, typically 
indexes are created (for example, see Kling, Liebman, and Katz, 2007).  In the case of this 
paper, since all outcomes are mortality rates, the aggregation amounts to have total mortality 
rates as aggregate outcomes (as it is done here, see previous subsection).  
Additionally, for the analysis by cause of death, p-values need to be adjusted to correct for 
multiple comparisons in order not to draw incorrect inferences. In this paper I use the FDR 
correction proposed by Benjamini, Krieger, and Yekuteli (2006).24 Given that mortality rates by 
cause are subcategories of total mortality rates by age group and gender, the groups over which 
the correction is applied are the ones defined by age bands and gender. This procedure allows 
the calculation of q-values, which have an interpretation analogous to p-values (as they 
effectively are FDR-adjusted p-values) and, within an FDR context, represent the smallest 
values at which the hypotheses under testing would be rejected. The p-values and the q-values 
are both reported in Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7. It is apparent that no q-value is below 0.10, 
suggesting that it is not possible to pinpoint a specific precise change in mortality rates due to a 
cause of death as a consequence of the IPS. 
5. Discussion 
 Results presented in the previous section show that estimates on total mortality 
rates of younger elderly men aged between 65 and 74 are precise, allowing me to conclude that 
the group of elderly men aged between 65 and 74 was adversely affected by the IPS, whereas 
there is no precise estimate on mortality for men aged between 75-84 and no precise estimate on 
total mortality rates for older elderly men. In this paper (as in the other papers looking at the 
impact of the IPS on other outcomes), I look at whether the IPS affected mortality rates for all 
                                                          
24
 Appendix 5 presents the steps to apply the procedure by Benjamini, Krieger, and Yekuteli (2006) in more detail. 
FDR offers a more balanced approach compared to, for example, a Bonferroni correction in the trade-off between 
correct and false rejections. 
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people aged 65, and not all of them will be affected by the IPS because not all of them need 
Medicare home health care. This means that the average effect of the IPS needs to be strong 
³HQRXJK´WREHGHWHFWHGZLWKSUHFLVLRQ, and this precision will be low if there are heterogeneous 
effects within a subgroup. Therefore, given that here I have data for the entire population, when 
an estimate is imprecise, it does not mean that no subgroups of people may have been affected 
by the IPS; however, it may mean that the possible effect for the subgroup affected is not large 
enough to be detected with precision in the group of elderly under study. 
However, it is of interest to try to understand why I find a precise estimate of the IPS on total 
mortality for elderly men aged between 65 and 74 but not for older men. A possible explanation 
is the existence of decreasing marginal returns in terms of preventing mortality with home 
health care the more fragile elderly men are. In the end, there is only so much that can be done 
to prevent death, and older elderly men, being more fragile, are more likely to die independent 
of the care received. In other words, these results suggest that for these men aged 75 or more, 
even before the IPS, home health care was unlikely to prevent deaths, and this may be the 
reason why the IPS, on average, was not associated with a change in total mortality for this 
group. Table 8 presents some evidence that older Medicare beneficiaries who used home care 
before the IPS tend to be more fragile compared to younger men aged 65-74. The table uses the 
Rand dataset of the Health and Retirement Study for years 1994 and 1996 and for the Asset and 
Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old for years 1993 and 1995.25 To construct the table, I focus on 
male Medicare beneficiaries who had used home care since the previous interview (the surveys 
do not ask whether respondents are currently using home health care) and who report having at 
least one limitation among the following: bathing, eating, dressing, walking across a room, and 
getting in or out of bed. These elderly, due to their limitations, are plausibly likely to be eligible 
for Medicare home health care. Table 8 suggests that men aged 75 or older who have at least 
                                                          
25
 Please see a description of the Rand HRS and AHEAD data at: http://www.rand.org/labor/aging/dataprod.html. 
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one limitation and who used Medicare home health care since the previous interview tend to 
have a higher number of limitations compared to younger elderly aged between 65 and 74 (2.63 
compared to 2.27; the difference is statistically significant). This finding suggests that it is 
plausible that death is more difficult to prevent for these older elderly men with home health 
care, compared to younger elderly men. This, in turn, makes it entirely possible that a decline in 
home health care services does not change total mortality for these men.26 
           My results suggest that the IPS did not significantly affect mortality rates for women. In 
general, mortality is the most obvious difference in health outcomes by gender (Sickles and 
Taubman, 1997), and it is very much an open question why such differences in mortality by 
gender exist and what may increase or decrease such differences. It is also important to 
highlight that the IPS was in place for only a relatively short period of time, and so results on 
mortality could have been the same if the policy had been in place longer. Nevertheless, these 
results show short-term effects of public cuts to home health care on mortality rates for men 
aged 65-74 but no precise effects on women, suggesting that changes in home health care 
financing may affect changes in differences in mortality by gender at least in the short run. The 
paper provides in the text and appendices a series of tests and robustness checks that the reader 
can inspect to form a view of how the IPS relates to mortality. As mentioned in section 3.3.2, 
under the identifying assumption of the DID model, these estimates represent the causal impact 
of the IPS on mortality, and estimates are precise when looking at total mortality for men aged 
64-74. However, there are also some imprecise estimates, and data limitation do not allow 
further analysis along the lines of income, which was shown to be a relevant dimension to 
                                                          
26
 There is also evidence from the medical literature suggesting that older patients with a given condition are sicker 
the older they are. For example, Alhuwalia et al. (2011) report that older elderly Medicare beneficiaries with heart 
disease tend to have more comorbidities compared to younger elderly, and Piccirillo et al. (2008) show that the 
severity of comorbidities among cancer patients increases with age. Also, the older the person, the less the lungs 
function properly (Sharma and Goodwin, 2006), and the severity of chronic respiratory diseases tends to increase 
with age as a consequence (Jarad, 2011), leading to serious complications. This suggests that it is entirely possible 
that less could be done to save older patients compared to younger patients with home health care even before the 
IPS; therefore, it is plausible that the IPS did not significantly affect, on average, mortality rates for older Medicare 
patients.  
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consider in previous work on the impact of IPS (for instance, see McKnight, 2006); therefore, to 
a more conservative eye, the estimates presented here may be seen as evidence of, if not a 
causal link, at least a relationship between the IPS and mortality.  
Finally, this paper is not the only paper finding that changes in Medicare insurance precisely 
affect mortality for men but not for women. An example of another recent paper finding a 
precise impact on mortality rates for men but not for women is the paper on the impact of 
Medicare Part D on mortality rates by Huh and Reif (2017). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 I exploit the time and state variation provided by a unique quasi-experiment generated 
by the IPS in the 1990s to study whether limiting public funding for home health care affects 
elderly mortality using administrative data on the universe of deaths of the elderly. My results 
suggest that the imposition of limits on reimbursement to public home health care can affect 
elderly mortality for some groups of elderly.  
 This finding that the IPS affected mortality for some elderly differs from findings on the impact 
of the IPS on mortality by previous research, which used survey data (McKnight, 2006) or 
focused on a subgroup of elderly Medicare beneficiaries (Huckfeldt et al., 2015), and did not 
find that the IPS affected mortality. 
 Additionally, these results showing that as a consequence of the IPS mortality for men 
and women changed differentially contribute to our understanding of triggers of changes in 
differences in mortality by gender.  
 
 
21 
 
References  
Ahluwalia, S.C., Gross, C.P., Chaudhry, S.I., Leo-Summers, L, Van Ness, P.H., Fred, T.R. 
2011.Change in comorbidity prevalence with advancing age among persons with heart failure. 
Journal of General Internal Medicine 26: 1145 
Anderson, M. 2008. Multiple Inference and Gender Differences in the Effects of Early 
Intervention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training Projects. 
2008. Journal of the American Statistical Association. 103(484): pp. 1481-1495  
Anderson RN, Miniño AM, Hoyert DL, Rosenberg HM. 2001. Comparability of Cause of 
Death Between ICD-9 and ICD-10: Preliminary Estimates. National Vital Statistics Reports. 49: 
1±32.  
Brown, J. 2002. Differential Mortality and the Value of Individual Account Retirement 
Annuities. in M. Feldstein and J. Liebman, The Distributional Effects of Social Security 
Reform, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL, 2002 
Benjamini, Y., Krieger, A., and Yekutieli, D. 2006. Adaptive Linear Step-Up Procedures 
That Control the False Discovery Rate. Biometrika, 93, 491±507. 
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., Mullainathan, S., 2004. How Much Should We Trust Difference in 
Differences Estimates. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 249-275 
Buckles, B. Hagemann, A., Malamud, O., Morrill, M., and Wozniak , A.2016.The Effect of 
College Education on Mortality. Journal of Health Economics, 50: 99±114. 
Card, D., Dobkin, C., Maestas, N., 2009. Does Medicare save lives? Q. J. Econ. 124 (2),597±
636. 
&DVH$QQH&DQG&KULVWLQD3D[VRQ³Sex Differences in Morbidity and Mortality.´
Demography 42, 2 (2005): 189-214. 
22 
 
Chiang, C. L., 1991. Competing Risks in Mortality Analysis. Annual Review of Public Health, 
12: 281-307 
Coile, C., P. B. Levine, R. McKnight.2014. Recessions, Older Workers, and Longevity: How 
Long Are Recessions Good for Your Health? American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 
6(3): 92-119. 
    Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General. 2001. Home Health 
Community Beneficiaries 2001. October 2001  
    Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
2010. Medicare Home Health Care 
        Engelhardt, G.V.,Greenhalgh-Stanley, N, 2010.Home Health Care and the Housing and 
/LYLQJ$UUDQJHPHQWVRIWKH(OGHUO\´-RXUQDORI8UEDQ(FRQRPLFV0DUFK-
238. 
    Evans, W. N. and Moore, T. 2012. Liquidity, Economic Activity, and Mortality  
  Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(2): 400-418. 
    Evans, W. N. and Moore, T. 2011.The Short-Term Mortality Consequences of Income 
Receipt.Journal of Public Economics, 95(11-12): 1410-1424. 
Finkelstein, A and McKnight, R. 2008 "What Did Medicare Do? The Initial Impact of 
Medicare on Mortality and Out of Pocket Medical Spending." Journal of Public Economics 92: 
1644-1669. 
Golberstein, E., Grabowski, D.C., Langa, K.M., and Chernew, M. 2009. Effect of Medicare 
Home Health Care Payment on Informal Care. Inquiry, 46(1): 58-71. 
Health Care Financing Administration, 2000. Medicare and Home Health Care. Baltimore: 
Health Care Financing Administration Publication HCFA-10969 
23 
 
Health Care Financing Administration (various years). Health Care Financing Review, 
Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
DC. 
Health Care Financing Administration, 1999. Federal Register, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington D.C: August 5 
 Huckfeldt, P. J., Sood, N., Escarce, J., J., Grabowski, D. C., Newhouse, J. P., 2014. Effects 
of Medicare payment reform: Evidence from the home health interim and prospective payment 
systems. Journal of Health Economics, E34(C): 1-18 
Huh, J. and Reif, J . 2017. Did Medicare Part D Reduce Mortality? Journal of Health 
Economics, May, 53: 17-37 
Jarad, N. 2011. Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and old age?. Chronic Respiratory  
Disease, 8 (2): 143-151. 
 Kaestner, R., Long, C., Alexander, G.C., 2014. Effects of Prescription Drug Insurance 
on Hospitalization and Mortality: Evidence From Medicare Part D. NBER Working Paper # 
19948 
          Kling J.R., Liebman, J.B., and Katz, L.  2007. "Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood 
Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 83-119, January 
McInerney, M., and Mellor, J. M.2012. 5HFHVVLRQVDQG6HQLRUV¶+HDOWK+HDOWK%HKDYLRXUV
and Healthcare Use: Analysis of the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey. Journal of Health 
Economics, 31, 744±751 
McKnight, R. 2004. Home Care Reimbursement, Long-Term Care Utilization, and Health 
Outcomes. NBER WP # 10414 
McKnight, R., 2006. Home Care Reimbursement, Long-Term Care Utilization, and Health 
Outcomes. Journal of Public Economics, 90(1):293-323. 
24 
 
Meissner A. 2016. Hypertension and the Brain: A Risk Factor for More Than Heart Disease. 
Cerebrovascular Diseases Vol. 42, No. 3-4  
Montauk, S., L. Home Health Care. American Family Physician. 1998 Nov 1; 58(7):1608-
1614 
Nathanson, C. A. (1984). Sex differences in mortality. Annual Review of Sociology, 191-213 
2UVLQL&³&KDQJLQJ7KH:D\7KH(OGHUO\/LYH(YLGHQFH)URPWKH+RPH+HDOWK
&DUH0DUNHW,QWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´-RXUQDORI3XEOLF(FRQRPLFV vol. 94(1-2), pages 142-152 
Piccirillo, J.F., Vlahiotis, A., Barrett, L.B., Flood, K.L., Spitznagel, E.L., Steyerberg, E.W. 
The changing prevalence of comorbidity across the age spectrum. Critical Reviews in 
Oncology/Hematology. 2008;67(2):124±32. 
Pilichowski  E., Arnould E., and Turkisch E. Ageing and the Public Sector: Challenges for 
Financial and Human Resources, OECD Journal on Budgeting, 7 (4): 1-40. 
Ruhm, C., 2000. Are Recessions Good For Your Health? .Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
115( 2):617-650. 
    Sharma, G. and Goodwin, J. 2006. Effect of aging on respiratory system physiology and 
immunology. Clinical Interventions in Aging I (3): 253-260. 
    Sickles, R. C., & P. Taubman, P. 1997. Mortality and morbidity among adults and the elderly. 
In M. R. Rosenzweig & O. Stark (Eds.), Handbook of population and Family Economics 
Snyder, S. E., Evans, W. N., 2006. The impact of income on mortality: evidence from the 
Social Security notch. Review of Economics and Statistics 88 (3): 482±495  
Sommers, B.D., Long, S.K., Baicker, K., 2014. Changes in mortality after Massachusetts 
health care reform: a quasi-experimental study. Ann. Intern.Med. 160 (9), 585±593. 
Stevens, Ann H, Douglas L. Miller, Marianne E. Page and Mateusz Filipski. 2015. The Best of 
Times, the Worst of Times: Understanding Pro-cyclical Mortality. American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy, 7(4): 279-311. 
25 
 
Zizza, C. A., Ellison, K. J., Wernette, C. M. 2009. Total Water Intakes of Community-Living 
Middle-Old and Oldest-Old Adults. The Journals of Gerontology Series A: Biological Sciences 
and Medical Sciences. 64A (4): 481-486.   
Zopf. P. 1992. Mortality Patterns and Trends in the United States. Greenwood: Westport, CT. 
FIGURES 
Figure 1 
Panel A: Trends in Mortality Rates for Men 65+, 1993-2000 
 
Panel B: Trends in Mortality Rates for Women 65+, 1993-2000 
 
Note: the graphs above plot yearly mortality rates for men and women of various ages for states in the 
top 25th SHUFHQWLOHRIWKH5HVWULFWLYHQHVV0HDVXUH³+LJKO\5HVWULFWHG6WDWHV´DQGIRUVWDWHVLQWKH
bottom 75th SHUFHQWLOHRIWKH5HVWULFWLYHQHVV0HDVXUH³2WKHU6WDWHV´. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Total Number of Medicare Home Health Care Visits  
By Type of Service, 1996 and 1999 
Number of Visits By 
Type of Service 
1996 1999 Percent Drop in Visits 
Between 1996 and 1999 
Nursing Care  108,839,000 54,914,000 49% 
Home Health Aide 129,502,000 38,949,000 70% 
Physical Therapy 19,320,000 14,865,000 23% 
Speech Therapy 1,292,000 792,000 23% 
Occupational Therapy 3,142,000 2,731,000 13% 
Medical Social Services 2,704,000 1,188,000 57% 
Source: Health Care Financing Administration (1998 and 2001). 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics, Deaths By Cause, as a fraction of total deaths, 
Men and Women aged 65 +, Years 1993-2000 
Cause of death           Men  Women 
   
Diseases of the heart 0.3469 0.3560 
   
Malignant neoplasm 0.2543 0.1947 
   
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
and allied conditions 
0.0619 0.0490 
   
Cerebrovascular disease 0.0626 0.0891 
   
Diabetes mellitus 0.0248 0.0290 
   
Remaining causes of death 0.2495 0.2823 
   
Total Deaths 6277877 7526279 
Note: Tabulations from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for years 1993-2000. Causes of 
death are grouped according to World Health Organization groupings followed also by the CDC. See Section 3 for 
more information. 
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Table 3. Principal diagnosis of people admitted to Medicare Home Health Care, and 
number of Person Served and Visits Per Person, years 1996 and 1999 
Principal Diagnosis of Persons 
Using Medicare Home Health 
Care 
Number of Person Served (in 000 
and % of total person served, in 
parentheses) 
Visits Per Person 
Served 
 1996 1999 1996 1999 
Diseases of the Circulatory System 1059 
(29.4) 
855 
(31.4) 
73 31 
Neoplasms 232 
(6.4) 
190 
(7) 
43 22 
Diseases of the Respiratory System 289 
(8) 
315 
(11.6) 
62 26 
Diabetes Mellitus 257 
(7.1) 
172 
(6.3) 
131 67 
The diagnosis (ICD codes) ZLWKLQ WKH FDWHJRU\ ³'LVHDVHV RI WKH &LUFXODWRU\ 6\VWHP´ include all diagnoses 
(ICD codes) that are also within the category oIGHDWKVIRU³'LVHDVHVRIWKH+HDUW´DQG³&HUHEURYDVFXODU'LVHDVHV´, 
which are two of the categories of causes of death studied here, plus the diagnosis (ICD codes) RI ³(VVHQWLDO
Hypertension,´ZKLFKLVDPDMRUULVNIDFWRUGHDWKVIRU³'LVHDVHVRIWKH+HDUW´DQGGHDWKVGXHWR³&HUHEURYDVFXODU
DLVHDVHV´ (see Appendix 2). PeRSOHDGPLWWHG WRKRPHKHDOWKFDUHZLWK WKHDGPLVVLRQGLDJQRVLV³'LVHDVHVRI WKH
Respiratory S\VWHP´ DUH SHRSOH who HLWKHU DOUHDG\ KDYH ³&KURQLF 2EVWUXFWLYH 3XOPRQDU\ 'LVHDVHV DQG Allied 
Conditions,´ZKLFKFDQEHIDWDO, and is one of the categories of causes of death studied here, or are people with 
diagnosis that can lead to death for Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Diseases and Allied Conditions (see Appendix 
2). 
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Table 4. Estimation Results, Impact of the IPS on Elderly Mortality, Various Groups 
        Estimates*100                              
 
Total Deaths from the Policy 
 Men 
(1) 
Women 
(2) 
 
Men 
(3) 
 
Women 
(4) 
 
 
65 plus 0.02432 
(0.01153) 
 [0.040] 
0.00116 
(0.0202) 
  [0.954] 
7914.71 
 
465.24 
 
 {0.3307} {0.0158}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.05631 0.04659 
 
  
     
65-74 0.04551 
(0.02356) 
 [0.059] 
0.00472 
(0.02352) 
 [0.842] 
4685.26 
 
379.21 
 
 {0.6189} {0.0642}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.03186 0.01961   
     
75-84 0.000317 
(0.01487) 
[0.347] 
0.01533 
(0.02207) 
[0.491] 
43.77 
 
2216.39 
 
 {0.0043} {0.2085}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.07245 0.04799   
     
85 plus 0.03737 
(0.02853) 
[0.196] 
{0.5082} 
-0.01323 
(0.02759) 
  [0.634] 
{-0.1799} 
3154.26 -2330.84 
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.17675 0.14357   
N   408   408   
Columns 1 and 2 present estimates of ߛ in Equation 2  in the main text multiplied per 100 and represent the percent 
change in mortality rates due to a decline of 0.25 visits per beneficiary. The percent effect of the IPS on mortality is 
in curly brackets. P-values of the estimates are in square brackets. Calculations in columns 3 and 4 use estimates in 
columns 1 and 2; see details in Section 3 and Appendix 1. Controls in every regression include state and year fixed 
effects, yearly state unemployment rate and state trends. 
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Table 5. Estimation Results by Causes of Death, Elderly Aged 65-74 
 Estimates*100 Total  Deaths from the policy 
 Men 
 (1) 
Women 
  (2) 
Men 
 (3) 
Women 
   (4) 
Diseases of the heart 0.04105  
(0.02394) 
 [0.093] 
0.06163 
(0.06972) 
 [0.381] 
1298.88 1245.6 
    0.216      1   
 {0.5583} {0.8382}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.01036 0.00531   
Malignant neoplasms 0.09211 
(0.04178) 
 [0.032] 
-0.0158 
(0.04618) 
 [0.734] 
3142.26 -437.66 
   0.216       1   
 {1.2527} {-0.2149}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.01058 0.00677   
Cerebrovascular 
diseases 
0.06514 
(0.08652) 
 [0.455] 
-0.19054 
(0.07849) 
  [0.019] 
292.29 -861.50 
   0.295    0.129   
 {0.8859} {-2.5913}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.00143 0.00109   
Chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease 
and allied conditions 
0.17517 
(0.09062) 
 [0.059] 
-0.00405 
(0.10439) 
  [0.969] 
1169.18 -24.57 
   0.216       1   
 {2.3823} {-0.0551}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.00199 0.00138   
Diabetes mellitus -0.10483 
(0.13473) 
  [0.440] 
-0.03172 
(0.14671) 
  [0.830] 
-356.73 -110.07 
    0.295      1   
 {-1.4257} {-0.4314}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.00094 0.00082   
All remaining causes 
of death 
-0.06021 
(0.07306) 
  [0.414] 
  0.03981 
(0.05615) 
 [0.482] 
-1366.67 730.42 
    0.295       1   
 {-0.8189} {0.5414}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.00656 0.00423   
N    408    408   
Columns 1 and 2 present estimates of ߛ in Equation 2 in the main text multiplied per 100 and represent percent 
change in mortality rates due to a decline of 0.25 visits per beneficiary. The percent effect of the IPS on mortality is 
in curly brackets. P-values of the estimates are in square brackets. Q-values are in italics. Calculations in columns 3 
and 4 use estimates in columns 1 and 2; see details in Section 3. Controls in every regression include state and year 
fixed effects, yearly state unemployment rate and state trends. 
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Table 6. Estimation Results by Causes of Death, Elderly Aged 75-84 
 Estimates*100 Total  Deaths from the policy 
 Men 
 (1) 
Women 
  (2) 
Men 
 (3) 
Women 
   (4) 
     
Diseases of the heart 0.02956 
(0.03289) 
[0.373] 
0.01079   
(0.04017) 
[0.789] 
1333.34 490.40 
      1     1   
 {0.40202} {0.14674}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.02489 0.01616   
Malignant neoplasms 0.01649   
(0.05973) 
[0.784] 
-0.00203 
(0.04389) 
[0.963] 
568.54 -64.15 
      1      1   
 {0.2243} {-0.02761}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.01806 0.01043   
Cerebrovascular 
diseases 
-0.03327 
(0.10124) 
[0.744] 
0.11442 
(0.07938) 
[0.156] 
-289.69 2342.62 
     1    0.88   
 {-0.4525} {1.5561}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.00481 0.00421   
Chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease and 
allied conditions 
0.06922 
(0.05473) 
[0.212] 
 0.14527* 
(0.08366) 
  [0.089] 
661 1336 
     1     0.88   
 {-0.9414} {1.9757}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.00488 0.00285   
Diabetes mellitus 0.02307 
(0.15656) 
 [0.883] 
-0.00809 
(0.11197) 
 [0.943] 
88.24 -39.93 
      1    0.88   
 {0.3137} {-0.1100}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.00183 0.00156   
All remaining causes 
of death 
-0.05446 
(0.05721) 
  [0.346] 
-0.02076 
(0.04488) 
  [0.646] 
-1980.63 -860.49 
       1     0.88   
 {-0.7406} {-0.2823}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
0.01797 0.0128   
N    408    408   
Columns 1 and 2 present estimates of ߛ in Equation 2 in the main text multiplied per 100 and represent percent 
change in mortality rates due to a decline of 0.25 visits per beneficiary. The percent effect of the IPS on mortality is 
in curly brackets P-values of the estimates are in square brackets. Q-values are in italics. Calculations in columns 3 
and 4 use estimates in columns 1 and 2; see details in Section 3. Controls in every regression include state and year 
fixed effects, yearly state unemployment rate and state trends. 
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Table 7. Estimation Results by Causes of Death, Elderly Aged 85 or Above 
 Estimates*100 Total  Deaths from the policy 
 Men 
 (1) 
Women 
  (2) 
Men 
 (3) 
Women 
   (4) 
      
Diseases of the heart  0.04497  
(0.05019) 
[0.375] 
-0.03522 
 (0.03524) 
  [0.322] 
1402.03 -2445 
    0.6       1   
  {0.6116} {-0.4789}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
 0.06799 0.05979   
Malignant neoplasms  -0.12541*   
(0.07353) 
 [0.094] 
-0.01725 
(0.05327) 
  [0.747] 
-1668.78 -298.38 
     0.348       1   
  {-1.7056} {-0.2346}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
 0.02749 0.01414   
Cerebrovascular 
diseases 
 0.14829 
(0.14987) 
[0.323] 
 0.01662 
(0.06887) 
[0.810] 
918.29 288.69 
      0.6      1   
  {2.0167} {0.2260}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
 0.01436 0.01414   
Chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease 
and allied conditions 
 -0.0694   
(0.15403) 
 [0.654] 
-0.10868 
(0.12212) 
[0.378] 
-324.11 -646.82 
     0.774      1   
  {-0.9438} {-1.4781}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
 0.00912 0.00419   
Diabetes mellitus  -0.11597 
(0.2133) 
 [0.589] 
-0.15679 
(0.13506) 
  [0.251] 
-194.28 -578.99 
     0.774       1   
  {-1.5772} {-2.1323}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
 0.00315 0.00282   
All remaining causes 
of death 
  0.07960**   
(0.03509) 
 [0.043] 
  0.00007 
(0.04598) 
 [0.988] 
2188.8 4.36 
     0.348      1   
  {1.0826} {0.0009}   
Mean of the mortality 
rate 
 0.07014 0.05189   
N    408   408   
Columns 1 and 2 present estimates of ߛ in Equation 2 in the main text multiplied per 100 and represent percent 
change in mortality rates due to a decline of 0.25 visits per beneficiary. The percent effect of the IPS on mortality is 
in curly brackets. P-values of the estimates are in square brackets. Q-values are in italics. Calculations in columns 3 
and 4 use estimates in columns 1 and 2; see details in Section 3. Controls in every regression include state and year 
fixed effects, yearly state unemployment rate and state trends. 
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Table 8. Number of Activity of Daily Living Limitations: Elderly Men aged 65 +, with at least one 
limitation, who used home health care since last interview 
 65-74 75 and older P-Value of the F-Test  
Difference is significant 
Total number of limitations 2.2706 2.6367 0.0899 
(Conditional on having any) (0. 1901) (0.1008)  
N 306  
 Note: Data are from the sample of respondents in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for years 1994 and 
1996, and in the Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) for years 1993 and 1995 as merged by 
Rand (version P). The sample is composed of men aged 65 or more who report to have used home health care since 
the last interview and who have at least one of the following limitations: bathing, eating, dressing, walking across a 
room, and getting in or out of bed. Table 5 presents coefficients and standard errors of a regression with no 
constant where the dependent variable is the number of limitations (conditional on having at least one) and the right 
hand side variables are two dummies: a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is an elderly man aged 65-74 and a 
dummy equal to1 if the respondent is aged 75 or older. The regression is weighted using the individual weights. 
The third column reports the P-value of the F-test of the null that the coefficient on the dummy equal to 1 if the 
elderly men are aged between 65 and 74 is equal to the coefficient of the dummy that is equal to 1 if the elderly 
men are aged 75 or older. 
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ON-LINE APPENDIXES 
Appendix 1 
A1.1 Causes of Death 
I focus on 5 top causes of deaths for individuals aged 65 or more, namely deaths from: 
diseases of the heart, malignant neoplasm, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and allied 
conditions, cerebrovascular disease, diabetes mellitus. I group the remaining deaths in a residual 
category. When presenting statistics or studying mortality by causes of death it is common to 
group specific International Classification of Diseases (ICD) codes according to the World 
Health Organization (WHO) regulations. For example, The Center For Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) commonly uses such grouping in presenting statistics on mortality (see, for 
example, the technical notes in the documents that accompany the mortality data provided by 
the CDC), so I follow the literature here in grouping ICD codes for deaths according to the 
convention. 
Causes of death in the period under study are coded according to two International 
Classification of Diseases codes (ICD), namely  ICD-9 and ICD-10 codes.  This means that my 
study spans more than one ICD classification, which is not uncommon when studying mortality 
(just as examples, other papers studying mortality in the US  that span more than one ICD 
classification are the papers by Coile, Levine and McKnight, 2014 and the paper by Ruhm, 
2000). To achieve comparability between the two classifications, the CDC estimates a 
comparability ratio calculated by dividing the number of deaths classified in the ICD-10 
revision by the number of deaths classified in the ICD-9 revision. The comparability ratios 
represent the level of correspondence between the ICD-9 and ICD-10 codes for a given 
condition and a ratio of 1 indicates full comparability between the two codes for a given 
condition (Anderson et al., 2001). Column 4 of Table A1.1 which reports comparability ratios 
shows that comparability codes for all five conditions I focus on here are very close to 1, 
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suggesting a very high level of correspondence between the ICD-9 and ICD-10 codes for 
mortality for conditions studied here. Additionally, even if there are two ICD codes in the 
period of my study, the ICD classification affected at the same time classification of deaths in 
all US states, so its effect is accounted for by the year fixed effect in Equation 2 in the main 
text. 
Table A1.1: Causes of Death and Comparability Ratios 
Cause of death ICD9-Code ICD10-Code Comparability 
Ratio 
Diseases of the heart 390-398, 
402,404,410-429 
I00-I09, I11,I13, I20-
I51 
0.9858 
    
Malignant neoplasm 140-208 C00-C97 1.0068 
    
Chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease 
and allied conditions 
490-496 J40-J47 1.0478 
    
Cerebrovascular 
disease 
430-434, 436-438 I60-I69 1.0588 
    
Diabetes mellitus 250 E10-E14 1.0082 
Source: Anderson et al. (2001). 
A1.2. Plausibility of the Identification Assumption 
To test the plausibility of the identification strategy of the difference-in-differences 
specification in Equation 2 of the main text²requiring that, absent the IPS, trends in mortality 
rates would have been the same in more intensively treated states compared to less intensively 
treated states²I restrict my sample to years 1993-1997 and interact year effects with the 
Restrictiveness measure, conditioning on state and year fixed effects as well as state 
unemployment rates, and I test the null hypothesis that the interaction of year dummies with the 
Restrictiveness measure are jointly 0. Estimates are reported in Table A1.2 below. In no case it 
is possible to reject the null that coefficients of the interaction of year dummies with the 
Restrictiveness measure are jointly 0. 
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Table A1.2: Testing the Identification Assumption 
Panel A: Men Men 65plus Men 65-74 Men 75-84 Men 85+ 
     
Year94*Restrictiveness 5.93e-06 -2.42e-06 -0.000043 0.000019 
 (0.000159) (0.000288) (0.00018) (0.000415) 
Year95*Restrictiveness -1.70e-06   0.000016 6.98e-07 -0.000219 
 (0.000150) (0.000236) (0.000203)   (0.000305) 
Year96*Restrictiveness -0.000129 -0.000095 1.57e-06 -0.000461 
  (0 .000159) (0.000285) (0.000181) (0.000312) 
Year97*Restrictiveness -0.000062 -0.000126   0.000088 -0.000253 
 (0.000178) (0.000303) (0.000217) (0.000551) 
N 255 255 255 255 
P_Value of the F test for 
the null: 
Coefficients are jointly 0 
0.9133 0.9754 0.9753 0.5798 
     
Panel B: Women  Women 
65plus 
Women 65-74 Women 75-84 Women 85+ 
Year94*Restrictiveness -0.000042   7.43e-06 -0.000310 0.000080 
 (0.000165) (0.000213) (0.000263) (0.000242) 
Year95*Restrictiveness 0.000205 0.00006 -0.000048 0.000397 
 (0.000160) (0.000226) (0.000303) (0.000188) 
Year96*Restrictiveness -0.000036 -0.000221   -0.000179 0.000063 
 (0.000141) (0.000240) (0.000205) (0.000158) 
Year97*Restrictiveness   -0.000139   -0.00016 -0.000434 0.000015 
 (0.000219) (0.000277) (0.000353) (0.000211) 
N 255 255 255 255 
P_Value of the F test for 
the null 
Coefficients are jointly 0 
0.1289 0.5348 0.2177 0.2986 
Note: Data restricted to years 1993-1997, omitted year is 1993, the outcome is mortality rate for a given group 
defined by age range and gender. I interact year effects with the Restrictiveness measure, conditioning on state and 
year fixed effects as well as state unemployment rates, and I test the null hypothesis that the interaction of year 
dummies with the Restrictiveness measure are jointly 0. 
 
I also provide graphs of estimates from an event study below. I have adopted the approach used 
by Hoynes, Miller, and Simon (2015) when studying the impact of OBRA 1993 on infant 
health. Specifically, after running the regressions with the event study, I have normalized the 
estimated coefficient for year 1997 interacted with the Restrictiveness measure to 0 and have 
plotted the coefficients in the graphs below for all groups studied in the paper. The graphs 
reveal that when looking at the combined group of men of men aged 65 or older and for the 
subgroup of men aged 65-74, there has been a sharp increase in mortality rates after 1997, 
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whereas before the policy the pattern was different. For other subgroups of men, also it appears 
that years 1998-2000 were years of higher mortality rates, whereas in general the pattern for 
women seems more volatile.  
Figure A1.1 Event Study 
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Notes: Each figure plots coefficients*1000 from an event-study analysis where the coefficients are year 
dummies interacted with the treatment indicator (the Restrictiveness Measure) and where the coefficient 
for year 1997 is normalized to 0. The specification also includes year and state effects, as well as yearly 
state unemployment rates. 
 
A1.3 Calculation: Deaths due to the IPS 
As stated in the main text (Section 3.3.3), the parameter estimate of  ߛ  multiplied by 100 
gives the percent impact of cutting reimbursements by 0.25 visits per Medicare beneficiary in 
the post policy period on the mortality rate for elderly of a given gender and age. To translate 
this estimate of the impact of cutting a given number of visits per Medicare Beneficiaries on 
elderly mortality, we need an estimate of the impact of the IPS on the number of home health 
care visits. One estimate provided by McKnight (2006) is that the IPS caused a decline equal to 
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3.4 visits per Medicare beneficiary, so to have the impact on the elderly mortality rate of a 
decline in reimbursement of 3.4 visits per Medicare beneficiary ߛ  needs to be multiplied by 
13.6 ( i.e. 3.4*4= 13.6). 
Below I use the estimates from equation 2 in the main text to provide a counterfactual 
calculation of the number of deaths there would have been absent the policy change. I call this 
number to be determinedܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ  , and I call the actual number of deaths after the IPS ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௔௖௧௨௔௟ . 
Also, I call the mortality rate that happened as a consequence of the IPS mortratepostips  and 
call the mortality rate that would have happened absent the policy change mortratenoips. Using 
the estimate of ߛ and the above information I have: 
ߛ כ  ? ? ?כ  ? ?Ǥ ? ൌ௠௢௥௧௥௔௧௘௣௢௦௧௜௣௦ି௠௢௥௧௥௔௧௘௡௢௜௣௦௠௢௥௧௥௔௧௘௡௢௜௣௦ *100                (1) 
I can rearrange the above as: 
 ݉݋ݎݐݎܽݐ݁݊݋݅݌ݏሺߛ כ  ? ?Ǥ ? ൅  ?ሻ ൌ ݉݋ݎݐݎܽݐ݁݌݋ݏݐ݅݌ݏ               
I call the population of the relevant state, age, and gender group after the IPS ܲ݋݌௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ  and I 
call the actual population after the IPS ܲ݋݌௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௔௖௧௨௔௟. Substituting in the equation above the 
mortality rates with the notation used for deaths and for population counts of the relevant group, 
the equation above can be rewritten as: ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌܲ݋݌௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ ሺߛ כ  ? ?Ǥ ? ൅  ?ሻ ൌ ܯ௜௝௔௖௧௨௔௟ܲ݋݌௜௝௔௖௧௨௔௟ 
since we have that ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ  and ܲ݋݌௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌare unknown, the equation above is not 
solvable. However, assuming that ܲ݋݌௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ=ܲ݋݌௜௝௔௖௧௨௔௟ , we have, as in the main text: ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌሺ ? ൅ ? ?Ǥ ? כ ߛሻ ൌ ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௔௖௧௨௔௟ 
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Finally, with the estimate of  ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ in hand, I can calculate the estimate of the number 
of deaths for a specific group and cause of death as the difference between ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௔௖௧௨௔௟ and ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ. 
Appendix 2. Causes of Death and Conditions for Admission in Medicare Home Health 
Care 
In this Appendix I show that the ICD 9 of the causes of death I focus on here are among 
codes of top causes of admission to Medicare home health care. Additionally, among top 
conditions of admission to Medicare home health care there are also risk factors that can lead to 
causes of death studied in this paper, suggesting that a decline in home health care provision as 
a consequence of the IPS could have affected mortality for the causes of death I focus on in this 
paper. Table A2 uses aggregated data tabulated in the Medicare and Medicaid Statistical 
Supplement in 1996 (Health Care financing Review) to show top causes of admission in 
Medicare home health care. Statistics on aggregated ICD9 codes for admission to Medicare 
home health care are available in the Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement of the 
Health Care Financing Review (Health Care Financing Administration, various years). ICD9 
codes of conditions of admission in Medicare home health care in these data are aggregated 
differently from the way ICD 9 codes are aggregated when studying mortality according to the 
WHO convention. This difference in aggregation is perhaps not surprising: in fact, some 
conditions of admission are not causes of death per se; rather, they are risk factors for causes of 
death. For instance, in 1996, before the implementation of the IPS 29.9 percent of patients were 
DGPLWWHG WR0HGLFDUHKRPHKHDOWKFDUH IRU ³'LVHDVHVRI WKH&LUFXODWRU\6\VWHP´SHUFHQW
ZHUH DGPLWWHG IRU ³1HRSODVPV´  SHUFHQW ZHUH DGPLWWHG IRU ³'LVHDses of the Respiratory 
6\VWHP´DQGSHUFHQWZHUHDGPLWWHGIRU'LDEHWHV0HOOLWXV)URP7DEOH$LWLVDSSDUHQWWKDW
leading conditions for admission in Medicare home health care include the ICD 9 codes for the 
causes of death I study here and also include admissions in Medicare home health care for 
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conditions that are risk factors for causes of death I study here. For instance, all ICD9 codes for 
GHDWKV GXH WR ³'LVHDVH RI WKH +HDUW´ DQG GHDWKV GXH WR ³&KURQLF 2EVWUXFWLYH 3XOPRQDU\
GLVHDVH´ DUH LQFOXGHG LQ WKH FRGHV IRU DGPLVVLRQ IRU KRPH KHDOWK FDUH ZLWKLQ ³GLVHDVH RI WKH
&LUFXODWRU\6\VWHP´ZKLFKDFFRXQWIRUWKHKLJKHVWIUDFWLRQRIDGPLVVLRQSHUFHQWRISHRSOH
DGPLWWHGWR0HGLFDUHKRPHKHDOWKFDUHDUHDGPLWWHGIRU³'LVHDVHVRIWKH&LUFXODWRU\6\VWHP´). 
$OVR³'LVHDVHRIWKH&LUFXODWRU\6\VWHP´LQFOXGHRWKHUFRQGLWLRQVPRVWQRWLFHDEO\³(VVHQWLDO
+\SHUWHQVLRQ´,&'FRGHWKDWLVQRWDPDMRUFDXVHRIGHDWKSHUVHEXWWKDWLVDPDMRUULVN
IDFWRU IRU WKHFDXVHRIGHDWK³'LVHDVHRI WKH+HDUW´ DQG³&HUHEURYDVFXODU'LVHDVHV´DQG WKDW
includes a high percentage of admission to Medicare home health care (29 percent of total 
SHRSOHDGPLWWHGLQ0HGLFDUH+RPHKHDOWKFDUHIRU\HDUZHUHDGPLWWHGIRU³'LVHDVHVRIWKH
FLUFXODWRU\ V\VWHP´ DQG  SHUFHQW RI Whose were admitted for essential hypertension) . 
$GGLWLRQDOO\ DGPLVVLRQV WR 0HGLFDUH KRPH KHDOWK FDUH IRU ³1HRSODVP´ ZKLFK LQ 
accounted for 6.4 of total patients admitted to Medicare home health care) may of course 
include those neoplasms that degenerate in malignant neoplasms one of the causes of death I 
VWXG\KHUH,QIDFWDOOWKH,&'FRGHVIRU³0DOLJQDQW1HRSODVPV´DUHLQFOXGHGLQWKHFRGHVRI
DGPLVVLRQIRU0HGLFDUH+RPH+HDOWKFDUHIRU³1HRSODVPV´)LQDOO\SHRSOHDGPLWWHGWRKRPH
health care wLWK WKH DGPLVVLRQGLDJQRVLV ³'LVHDVHVRI WKH UHVSLUDWRU\ V\VWHP´ SHUFHQWRI
patients admitted to Medicare home health care in 1996) are people that either already have 
³&KURQLF 2EVWUXFWLYH 3XOPRQDU\ 'LVHDVHV DQG DOOLHG &RQGLWLRQV´ LH WKH ,QWHUQDWLRnal 
Classifications of Disease codes for people with Diseases of the Respiratory system include the 
FRGHV³&KURQLF2EVWUXFWLYH3XOPRQDU\'LVHDVHVDQGDOOLHG&RQGLWLRQV´ZKLFKFDQEHIDWDODQG
also include people with diagnoses  (ICD codes) that can lead to death for Chronic Obstructive 
Pulmonary Diseases and allied Conditions.  Information on health conditions (and respective 
ICD-9 codes) comes from Tabulations in the Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement, 
Health Care Financing Administration (1996). The tabulations reported in the Medicare and 
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Medicaid Statistical Supplement do not include all ICD 9 codes of admissions, it only presents 
the top ones aggregated in broader categories that in total account for 61.9 percent of patients 
admitted to Medicare home health care. Conditions of admission that include the causes of 
death studied here account for 75.4 percent of the top conditions of admission for Medicare 
home health care in 1996. However, as highlighted in the main text (Section 3.2), it is ultimately 
difficult to predict accurately which cause of death a person will die from, because at any given 
point in time people are exposed to risks of death for various causes.   For instance, Chiang 
(1991) writes that it is possible that in a study of cancer as a risk of death some persons may die 
for other causes during the study period. 
Table A2. ICD 9 Codes for Causes of Death and Conditions of Admission to  
                                             Medicare Home Health Care 
 
Panel A: Causes of 
Death 
          
 
 
           (1) 
ICD9 codes in 
causes of death 
           
 
 
       (2) 
 
Panel B: Conditions 
of admission to 
Medicare Home 
Health Care 
          
        (3) 
ICD9 codes in 
conditions of 
admission to 
Medicare Home 
Health Care 
      (4) 
Diseases of the heart 390-398, 
402,404,410-429 
Diseases of the 
Circulatory system 
390-459 
(29%)* 
Cerebrovascular 
disease 
430-434, 436-438 
    
Malignant neoplasm 140-208 Neoplasms 140-239 
(6.4%)* 
Chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease 
and allied conditions 
490-496 Diseases of the 
Respiratory System 
460-519 
(8%)* 
Diabetes mellitus 250 Diabetes mellitus 250 
(7.1%)* 
Source: Anderson et al. (2001) and Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement, 
various years. The Table shows in column 2 the ICD 9 codes associated with specific causes of death studied in the paper and in 
Column 4 it shows the ICD 9 codes associated with conditions of admission to Medicare home health care for year 1996. ICD9 
codes of causes of death in Column 2 are included in ICD9 codes of conditions of admission in Column 4. In Column 4 in 
parenthesis there is the percentage of patients admitted to Medicare home health care for each condition of admission  
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Appendix 3. Other results 
 
It is worth checking whether the impact of the IPS is different at different points of the 
distribution of the Restrictiveness measure. To this end, I divided states in various groups using 
the two classifications below: 
a) First classification: I divided states into 3 groups depending on whether they are in the 
bottom 33rd, medium 33rd, or top 33rd percentile of the distribution of values of the variable 
Restrictiveness. I then created three variables (called Restrictivenessfirst33, 
Restrictivenesssecond33, Restrictivenessthird33) equal to their respective restrictiveness 
measures for the three groups of states. So, for instance, Restrictivenessthird33 has values 
between 0.4 and 34.7 and the other variables similarly capture other parts of the distribution. 
b) Second classification: I have done a finer classification where I divided states into 4 groups 
depending on whether they are in the lowest 25th, second 25th, third 25th, or highest 25 
percentile of the distribution of values of the variable Restrictiveness. I then created four 
variables (called Restrictivenessfirst25, Restrictivenesssecond25, Restrictivenessthird25, 
Restrictivenessfourth25) equal to the respective Restrictiveness measures for the four groups 
of states. So, for instance, Restrictivenessfourth25 has values between 3.6 and 34.7 and the 
other variables similarly capture other parts of the distribution. 
 
For both cases a and b above, I interacted the newly created variables with the post dummy. I 
then tested whether the coefficients on the newly created variables interacted with the Post 
dummy were statistically different from each other to test whether the impact of the IPS was 
different for different visit bands. For instance, for the classification for case b above, I ran the 
following regression model (without a constant): 
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ܪ௜௝௧ ൌ ߙ௧ ൅ ௝ܵ ൅ ௝ܵݐ ൅ ܲ݋ݏݐ௧ߚ ൅ ࡼ࢕࢙࢚࢚ כ ܀܍ܛܜܚܑ܋ܜܑܞ܍ܖ܍ܛܛ܎ܑܚܛܜ૛૞ࢽ૚ ൅כ ܀܍ܛܜܚܑ܋ܜܑܞ܍ܖ܍ܛܛܛ܍܋ܗܖ܌૛૞ࢽ૛ ൅ࡼ࢕࢙࢚࢚ כ ܀܍ܛܜܚܑ܋ܜܑܞ܍ܖ܍ܛܛܜܐܑܚ܌૛૞ࢽ૜ ൅ ࡼ࢕࢙࢚࢚ כ ܀܍ܛܜܚܑ܋ܜܑܞ܍ܖ܍ܛܛ܎ܗܝܚܜܐ૛૞ࢽ૝ ൅ ݑ௝௧ ൅ ݁௜௝௧              (A3.1)             
and tested whether the coefficients ࢽ૚ǡ ࢽ૛ǡ ࢽ૜ǡࢽ૝ were pairwise equal to each other. 
Then I did a similar exercise using the variables described in classification a above. 
The results of these exercises are reported in Table A.3.1 below, which shows estimates of the 
variable Post interacted with the various Restrictiveness bands for men and women aged 65 or 
more. In both cases (using classification a as well as classification b above) and for both men 
and women, I could not reject the null that the coefficients on the post dummy interacted with 
the bands using different groupings of the Restrictiveness measure were equal to each other. 
However, it is also worth noting that when considering classifications a and b, the coefficient on 
the post dummy interacted with the highest values of the Restrictiveness measure: namely, Post 
interacted with Restrictivenessthird33 and Restrictivenessfourth25 was relatively more 
precisely estimated compared to estimates of Post interacted with the variables capturing other 
parts of the distribution of the Restrictiveness measure. For example, from Table A.3.1 below, 
for the group of men aged 65 or more, the point estimate of  Post*Restrictivenesthird33 has a p-
value of 0.097, whereas the p-values of the point estimates of Post*Restrictivenessfirst33 and 
Post*Restrictivenesssecond33 are  0.428 ad 0.889, respectively. A similar point can be made 
when looking at the point estimates and p-values of the variables Post*Restrictivenessfirst25, 
Post*Restrictivenesssecond25, Post*Restrictivenessthird25, and Post*Restrictivenssfourth25. 
Because the higher the Restrictiveness measure, the more severe the cuts imposed by the IPS, 
these results suggests a stronger relationship between the Restrictiveness measure and mortality 
rates when on average states have home health care agencies facing relatively higher cuts.  
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               Table A3.1 Impact of the IPS on Mortality, Men And Women 65+ 
                    Estimates with Various Bands of the Restrictiveness Measure  
Estimates*100 
Panel A: 3 bands of the Restrictiveness 
Measure 
Men 65 or More Women 65 or More 
 
  
Post*Restrictivenessfirst33 0.01626 0.00429 
 
(0.02037) (0.03053) 
 
[0.428] [0.889] 
Post* Restrictivenesssecond33 -0.02431 0.05443 
 
(0.17314) (0.15947) 
 
[0.889] [0.734] 
Post*Restrictivenesthird33 0.03787 -0.00691 
 
(0.02238) (0.03978) 
 
[0.097] [0.863] 
P-value of the F-test of the null: estimate of 
the parameter of Post*Restrictivenessfirst33is 
equal to the estimate of the parameter of  
Restrictivenesssecond33*post 
0.8098 0.7395 
   
P-value of the F-test of the null: estimate of 
the parameter of Post*Restrictivenessfirst33 is 
equal to the estimate of the parameter of  
Post*Restrictivenessthird33 
0.5707   0.8494 
   
P-value of the F-test of the null:  estimate of 
the parameter of  Post*Restrictivenessfirst33 
is equal to the estimate of the parameter of  
Post*Restrictivenessthird33 
0.7349 0.7303 
   
Panel B: 4 bands of the Restrictiveness 
Measure 
  
Post*Restrictivenessfirst25*post 0.01795 0.00501 
 
(0.01761) (0.02898) 
 
[0.313] [0.863] 
Post*Restrictivenesssecond25 -0.05313 -0.05702 
 
(0.11291) (0.10056) 
 
[0.640] [0.573] 
Post*Restrictivenessthird25 0.06568 0.02137 
 
(0.15678) (0.1132) 
 
[0.677] [0.851] 
Post*Restrictivenessfourth25 0.04143 0.00433 
 
(0.02036) (0.03833) 
 
[0.047] [0.911] 
 
  
P-value of the F-test of the null: estimate of 
the parameter of  Post*Restrictivenessfirst25 
is equal to the estimate of the parameter of  
0.5277            0.5287 
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Post*Restrictivenesssecond25 
   
P-value of the F-test of the null: estimate of 
the parameter of  Post*Restrictivenessfirst25 
is equal to the estimate of the parameter of  
Post*Restrictivenesthird25 
0.7582 0.8940 
   
P-value of the F-test of the null: estimate of 
the parameter of  Post*Restrictivenessfirst25 
is equal to the estimate of the parameter of  
Post*Restrictivenesfourth25 
0.4766 
 
0.9897 
   
P-value of the F-test of the null: estimate of 
the parameter of  
Post*Restrictivenesssecond25 is equal to the 
estimate of the parameter of  
Post*Restrictivenesthird25 
0.5140 0.6402 
   
P-value of the F-test of the null: estimate of 
the parameter of  
Post*Restrictivenesssecond25 is equal to the 
estimate of the parameter of  
Post*Restrictivenessfourth25 
0.4271 0.5896 
   
P-value of the F-test of the null: estimate of 
the parameter of  Post*Restrictivenessthird25 
is equal to the estimate of the parameter of  
Post*Restrictivenessfourth25 
0.8827 0.8809 
   
Note: estimates of equation 3.1 and a similar equation where instead of the variables Restrictivenessfirst25, 
Restrictivenesssecond25, Restrictivenessthird25, Restrictivenessfourth25, the variables Restrictivenessfirst33, 
Restrictivenesssecond33, Restrictivenessthird33 are used. 
Based on the above results, I dichotomized the treatment: namely, I created a dummy that is 
equal to 1 if the state is in the top 25th SHUFHQWLOHRIWKH5HVWULFWLYHQHVVPHDVXUH³7RS´) 
and interact such dummy with the post dummy. This variable measures the extent to which the 
impact of the IPS is larger in states in the top 25% of the values of the Restrictiveness measure 
compared to the other states. If I place ࡼ࢕࢙࢚࢚ כ ࢀ࢕࢖૛૞࢚ࢎࡼࢋ࢘ࢉࢋ࢔࢚࢏࢒ࢋ࢙࢚ in the outcome 
equation in the main text in section 3.3.1 instead of the Post*Restrictiveness variable, the 
resulting equation is as below: 
ܪ௜௝௧ ൌ ߙ௧ ൅ ௝ܵ ൅ ௝ܵݐ ൅ ܲ݋ݏݐ௧ߚ ൅ ࡼ࢕࢙࢚࢚ כ ࢀ࢕࢖૛૞࢚ࢎࡼࢋ࢘ࢉࢋ࢔࢚࢏࢒ࢋ࢙࢚ࢽ ൅ ݑ௝௧ ൅ ݁௜௝௧      (A3.2)                
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Estimates of the equation above are reported in Table A.3.2 below. They show that as, a 
consequence of the IPS, mortality rates for men aged 65 or more increased 0.8 percent more in 
states in the top 25th percentile of the Restrictiveness measure compared to states in the bottom 
75th percentile of the Restrictiveness measure. This difference is statistically significant (the p-
value is equal to 0.038). For women, the point estimate is similar to the point estimate for men, 
but estimates are imprecise (the p-value is equal to 0.212). Other estimates in the table below 
can be similarly interpreted. 
Table A3.2 Impact of the IPS on Elderly Mortality, Dichotomized Treatment 
 
 Men 65 or More Women 65 or More 
Post*Top25thpercentile   0.0084618 0.0086269 
 
(0.0039655) (0.0068255) 
P-value 0.038 0.212   
 Men 65-74 Women 65-74 
Post*Top25thpercentile   0.01566 0.01198 
 
(0.00633) (0.00778) 
P-value 0.017 0.130 
 Men 75-84 Women 75-84 
Post*Top25thpercentile 0.00028   0.01076 
 
0.00541 0.00734 
P-value 0.958 0.149 
 Men 85 or More Women 85 or More 
Post*Top25thpercentile   0.01403   0.00677 
 
0.00844 0.00671 
P-value 0.103 0.318 
Note: estimates of Equation A.3.2 above. 
Since estimates of the impact of the IPS on mortality rates were more precise for states in the 
top 25th percentile of the distribution of the Restrictiveness measure. Therefore, I divided states 
into two groups: ³+LJKO\5HVWULFWHG6WDWHV´  (states in the top 25th percentile of the 
Restrictiveness measure) and ³2WKHU6WDWHV´ and plotted mortality rates over time for men and 
women of different age groups. I report the figures below. For instance, for men aged 65 or 
more, Panel A of Figure A.3.1 displays that, in the period considered, mortality rates of men 
DJHGRUPRUHGHFOLQHGLQ³+LJKO\5HVWULFWHG6WDWHV´DQG³2WKHU6WDWHV´EHIRUHWKH,36
However, it is also apparent that after 1997 there was a sharp increase in mortality rates in 
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³+LJKO\5HVWULFWHG6WDWHV´WKDWLVPRUHSURQRXQFHGWKDQWKHLQFUHDVHLQPRUWDOLW\UDWHVLQ³2WKHU
6WDWHV´,QPRUWDOLW\UDWHVIRU³2WKHU6WDWHV´GHFOLQHGDJDLQEXWWKH\GHFOLQHGOHVVLQPRUH
restricted states. As it is apparent from the ILJXUHVLQ0F.QLJKW¶VSDSHURQWKHHQWLUH
group of elderly 65 or older, the decline in Medicare home healthcare after the IPS was indeed 
most pronounced in years 1998 and 1999, so what happens to mortality rates is understandable 
in light of the trends in visits for the entire group of elderly 65 or older. For women aged 65 or 
more, Panel B of Figure A.3.1 shows that mortality rates for women 65 or older increased over 
WLPHLQ³+LJKO\5HVWULFWHG6WDWHV´DQGLQ³2WKHU6WDWHV´7KLVLQFUHDVHVHHPVWRbecome a bit 
PRUHSURQRXQFHGIRUZRPHQLQ³+LJKO\5HVWULFWHG6WDWHV´FRPSDUHGWRZRPHQLQ³2WKHU
6WDWHV´DIWHU7KHILJXUHVIRUWKHRWKHUJURXSVDUHVLPLODUO\FRQVWUXFWHG7KHSLFWXUHVIRU
men (Panels C, E, and G of Figure A.3.1) illustrate the same point: the trends in decline in 
PRUWDOLW\UDWHVZHUHOHVVSURQRXQFHGIRUHOGHUO\PHQLQ³+LJKO\5HVWULFWHG6WDWHV´FRPSDUHGWR
SHRSOHLQ³2WKHU6WDWHV´DIWHUWKH,36)RUZRPHQ3DQHOV')DQG+RI)LJXUH$LWVHHPV
that differences between highly restricted states and other states were less pronounced (except 
IRUZRPHQDJHGEHWZHHQDQGIRUWKRVHOLYLQJLQ³+LJKO\5HVWULFWHG6WDWHV´PRUWDOLW\
UDWHVLQFUHDVHGDIWHUWKH,36EXWWKH\GHFUHDVHGIRUZRPHQLQ³2WKHU6WDWHV´ 
Figure A.3.1 
Panel A: Trends in Mortality Rates for Men 65+, 1993-2000 
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Panel B: Trends in Mortality Rates for Women 65+, 1993-2000 
 
 
Panel C: Trends in Mortality Rates for Men 65-74, 1993-2000 
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Panel D: Trends in Mortality Rates for Women 65-74, 1993-2000 
 
Panel E: Trends in Mortality Rates for Men 75-84, 1993-2000 
 
Panel F: Trends in Mortality Rates for Women 75-84, 1993-2000 
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Panel G: Trends in Mortality Rates for Men 85plus, 1993-2000 
 
 
Panel H: Trends in Mortality Rates for Women 85plus, 1993-2000 
 
Note: the graphs above plot yearly mortality rates for men and women of various ages for states in the 
top 25th SHUFHQWLOHRIWKH5HVWULFWLYHQHVV0HDVXUH³+LJKO\5HVWULFWHG6WDWHV´DQGIRUVWDWHVLQWKH
bottom 75th SHUFHQWLOHRIWKH5HVWULFWLYHQHVV0HDVXUH³2WKHU6WDWHV´ 
 
 
Appendix 4. Percent impact on the mortality rate and impact on total deaths of cutting 
reimbursements by one visit per Medicare beneficiary  
In this appendix I calculate the effects of a reduction of one home health visit per Medicare 
beneficiary on mortality rates and total deaths. From equation 2 in the main text , the estimate of  ߛ *100 gives the percent impact on mortality of impact of living²during the post policy 
period²in a state that provided an additional one visit per user above the regional (census 
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division) during the pre-policy period. Given that the census division portion of the IPS 
payment limit was 25%,  ߛ כ  ? ? ? can be interpreted as the percent impact on the mortality rate 
of cutting reimbursements by 0.25 visits per Medicare beneficiary in the post policy period; 
therefore, to recover the impact of cutting reimbursement of one visit, ߛ כ  ? ? ? needs to be 
multiplied by 4. Table A4.1 gives the percent impact on the mortality rate of cutting 
reimbursements by one visit per Medicare beneficiary in the post policy period for various 
groups. 
,WLVDOVRSRVVLEOHWRUHFRYHUWKHHVWLPDWHVRI³WRWDOGHDWKVSHUUHGXFHGKRPHKHDOWKYLVLWV´Ds 
H[SODLQHGEHORZ&DOFXODWLRQRI³WRWDOGHDWKVSHUUHGXFHGKRPHKHDOWKYLVLWV´LVSUHVHQWHGLQ
Table A4.2 for various groups 
Recall from section 3.3 that the difference between ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௔௖௧௨௔௟ and ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ  
JLYHV³GHDWKVSHUGHFOLQHLQYLVLWV´7RUHFRYHUWKHLPSDFWRI³GHDWKVSHUUHGXFHGKRPH
KHDOWKYLVLW´EHVLGHVUHFRYHULQJDVGRQHLQWKHPDLQWH[Wܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ, I need to recover what 
I call ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௣௔௥௧௜௔௟ூ௉ௌQDPHO\GHDWKVIRUD³SDUWLDO´,36LQZKLFh the average decline in 
visits per Medicare beneficiary was only 1 instead of the actual estimated 3.4. 
Therefore, I need to add another step and another formula to formula 3 in the main text 
of the paper to find the relationship between ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ and ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௣௔௥௧௜௔௟ூ௉ௌ  
The parameter estimate of  ߛ  multiplied by 100 gives the percent impact of cutting 
reimbursements by 0.25 visits per Medicare beneficiary in the post policy period on the 
mortality rate for elderly of a given gender and age. To recover the impact on the elderly 
mortality rate of a decline in reimbursement of 1 visits per Medicare beneficiary  ߛ כ  ? ? ?  needs 
to be multiplied by 4. Therefore, I have the following relationship between ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ and ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௣௔௥௧௜௔௟ூ௉ௌ  expressed by Equation A4.1: 
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ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌሺ ? ൅  ? כ ߛሻ ൌ ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௣௔௥௧௜௔௟ூ௉ௌ        (A4.1) 
 
The above is an equation with two unknowns, but it is possible to solve it when using the results 
from solving Equation 3 in the main text, which I report again for convenience below: 
         
                  ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌሺ ? ൅ ? ?Ǥ ? כ ߛሻ ൌ ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௔௖௧௨௔௟   
 
Because I know what ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௔௖௧௨௔௟ is from actual death records between 1998 and 2000, I can 
use ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௔௖௧௨௔௟ to recover ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ and I can then use ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ in Equation A4.1 
above to recover ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௣௔௥௧௜௔௟ூ௉ௌ. 
The actual ³GHDWKVSHUUHGXFHGKRPHKHDOWKYLVLW´IRUHDFKJURXSDQGFDXVHRIGHDWKFDQEH
calculated as the difference between ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௣௔௥௧௜௔௟ூ௉ௌ and ܯ௜௝ଽ଼ି଴଴௡௢ூ௉ௌ.  
7DEOH$3HUFHQW&KDQJHLQ0RUWDOLW\5DWHVSHU0HGLFDUH%HQHILFLDU\3HU³5HGXFHG
+RPH+HDOWK9LVLWV´ 
 Men 
(1) 
Women 
(2) 
Age 65+ 0.09728 0.00464 
   
Age 65-74 0.18204 0.01888 
   
Age 75-84 0.001268 0.06132 
   
Age 85+ 0.14948 -0.05292 
Columns 1 and 2 present estimates of ߛ in Equation 2 in the main text multiplied per 100*4 and represent the 
percent change in mortality rates due to a decrease of one visit per Medicare beneficiary for different subgroups.  
7DEOH$7RWDO'HDWKV3HU³5HGXFHG+RPH+HDOWK9LVLWV´ 
 Men 
(1) 
Women 
(2) 
Age 65+ 2327 136 
   
Age 65-74 1378 111 
   
Age 75-84 13 652 
   
Age 85+ 927 -685 
Columns 1 and 2 use estimates of ߛ in Equation 2, calculations in Table A.4.1, and calculations detailed in 
Appendix 4 to calculate Total Deaths due to a decrease of one visit per Medicare Beneficiary for different 
subgroups.  
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Appendix 5. FDR Correction 
I this Appendix I report a summary of the steps for implementing the FDR correction procedure 
proposed by BKY (2006). The description below is in large part from the summary in Anderson 
(2008). Since the BKY(2006) FDR correction has as a starting point Benjamini and Hochberg 
¶VSURFHGXUHLWLVZRUWKUHSRUWLQJKRZWRLPSOHPHQWWKLVSURFHGXUHILUVW$FFRUGLQJWR
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995), suppose that we are testing an M hypothesis that we call H1, 
H« HM , and order the p-values of the hypothesis from the smallest to the largest so that p1 < p2 
< y ·  ·  < pM.  If q א (0,1) and  c is the largest r for which pr < qr/M, beginning with pM , we check 
whether each p-value meets pr < qr/M. When one does, we reject it and all smaller p-values. 
Rejecting all hypotheses H1, H« HC controls the FDR at level q.  The procedure can be 
sharpened because Benjamini DQG+RFKEHUJ¶VSURFHGXUHLVVWLOOFRQVHUYDWLYHEHFDXVH
we do not know the number of the true null hypotheses, let us call this number m0. If we did, we 
could replace qr/M  with qr/m0, which would be advantageous because qr/m0 >= qr/M.  The BKY 
(2006) two-step procedure estimates the number m0 to have a sharpened FDR control compared 
to the one proposed by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995), from now on referred to as BH. As 
Anderson (2008) reports, the procedure is implemented in two steps: 
 
 
1Apply the BH procedure at level  q= q/(1 + q).  
Let c be the number of hypotheses rejected. If c = 0, stop; otherwise, continue to step 2. 
2. Let ݉଴ෞ ൌ ܯ െ ܿ 
3. Apply the BH procedure at level q* = T¶0݉଴ෞ . 
 
Anderson (2008) also provides a Stata do file that gives the smallest q at which the hypothesis 
under test would be rejected, calculated using the BKY (2006) procedure. This value in the 
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context of correction for FDR is an analogue of the p-value. These smallest q at which the 
hypothesis under test would be rejected are the values reported in italics in Tables 5, 6 and 7 in 
the revised version of the paper. 
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